





QUANTITATIVE METRICS FOR HEDGE FUND PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION:  






A thesis submitted to John Hopkins University in conformity  










© 2014 Darsh Singh 






Abstract: In the past two decades, the number of hedge funds and the amount of assets 
being managed by hedge funds have skyrocketed in lockstep with increased allocations to 
hedge funds from institutional investors across the globe. This paper discusses the 
importance of manager selection in the hedge fund allocation process. It then touches on 
the development of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, a pivotal time in the history of fund 
performance measurement. Finally, it explores how a portfolio manager uses quantitative 
metrics in practice to evaluate potential hedge fund investment opportunities illustrated 
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Introduction and Description of Hedge Funds 
 
In 1997, BarclayHedge reported that the total assets managed by hedge funds were just 
over $100 billion. At the end of Q3, 2013, the report estimated that the hedge fund 
industry was managing over $2 trillion; in the last 16 years, the industry has grown by 
over 20 times.1 Additionally, the Boston Consulting Group believes that by 2015, over 
$3.3 trillion dollars will be allocated to hedge funds. As the growth of the industry 
continues, many institutional investors are exploring different frameworks for allocating 
capital to hedge funds. This paper explores a history of quantitative measures frequently 
used to evaluate hedge fund performance, current industry performance measurement 
standards, and a case study on how a portfolio manager at Satori Capital applies these 
techniques to manager selection. 
 
A. What are hedge funds? 
At the simplest level, hedge funds are investment vehicles that invest in wide range of 
financial instruments. This type of investment vehicle is managed or administered by a 
professional management firm that the capital providers believe has the ability to 
generate desirable investment returns. Typically, the management firm members invest a 
significant amount of their wealth in the vehicle alongside investors to demonstrate an 
alignment of interests. Historically, market regulations limited the availability of hedge 
fund investments to just sophisticated and accredited investors. Because of this regulatory 
                                                          






oversight, hedge funds have, and continue to receive, much more flexibility in the 
investment strategies they employ relative to traditional investment strategies. 
 
The economic function of hedge funds is to provide an array of investment options that 
seek to generate great investment returns on behalf of its investors. Over time, the hedge 
fund industry has pioneered a wide range of investment strategies in the pursuit of 
desirable investment returns. Many wealthy individuals and institutional investors have 
reallocated capital to hedge funds because traditional investment strategies may not have 
fulfilled the reward or risk targets the investor was seeking to achieve.  
 
B. What types of hedge fund strategies are there? 
The long-short equity strategy is debatably the oldest hedge fund strategy. The strategy 
consists of building long and short exposures in a portfolio such that correlations to the 
broad market are hedged (hence the term “hedge fund”). Typically, these managers 
implement deep fundamental analysis and build their thesis using a “bottoms-up” 
approach. The underlying assumption is that the manager maintains an extraordinary 
stock-picking ability and will be able to generate desirable absolute returns. One of the 
most notable long-short equity managers is Julian Robertson, founder of the Tiger 
Global.2 
 
A second strategy is the global macro approach, which can be viewed as “top-down” 
strategies. Managers use macroeconomic models and data to create broad investment 
                                                          





themes or theses. Many notable hedge fund managers use this approach, including 
George Soros and John Paulson. Event-driven strategies are characterized by an 
underlying thesis that value can be created or destroyed at the occurrence of a specific 
event, such as an acquisition, recapitalization, bankruptcy. The event-driven style has a 
large subset of popular strategies, including merger arbitrage, activist investing, 
distressed debt investing, and many more.3 In recent years, Kyle Bass of Hayman Capital 
has become a prominent event-driven manager. 
 
Lastly, there are relative value strategies, which are designed to profit from discrepancies 
in closely-linked securities. Typically, this strategy has little to no exposure to the 
movement of broad markets. Equity market neutral and credit long-short strategies are 
contained in this subset as well as a variety of arbitrage strategies including: fixed 
income, convertible, statistical, volatility and many more. One of the most famous hedge 
fund disasters involved a group called Long Term Capital Management, a team that 
included two Nobel Prize-winning economists and some of the most well-known people 
on Wall Street. This team implemented highly-levered arbitrage strategies across many 
markets and was very successful, until Russia defaulted on its debt in 1998 that sent 
shock waves across the market and put the all-star team out of business.45 
 
While these are a few broad categories that capture a large set of hedge fund strategies, 
there are countless other strategies and methods of investing capital in pursuit of returns 
                                                          
3 Ibid 
4 Ibid 
5 Lowenstein, Roger. When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital Management. New 





that have not been outlined here.  As macroeconomic settings shift and market 
microstructures are integrated and disintegrated, new strategies continue to emerge. 
Having a set of tools to evaluate the performance of a hedge fund becomes increasingly 
important for capital allocators to objectively select the best investment managers in the 
industry. 
 
Performance Dispersion Makes Manager Selection a Crucial 
Component of Hedge Fund Investing 
 
In the table below, the Lipper TASS database of hedge fund performance (which includes 
funds that have been eliminated from the selected universe, thereby reducing survivorship 
bias) was examined by Pete Wilson and Jason Malinowski from 2002-2011 to study fund 
performance dispersion within each asset class. 
Figure 1: Performance Dispersion by Asset Class (Wilson et. al 2012) 
 
Compared to the traditional equity and fixed-income asset classes, hedge funds as an 
asset class experienced significantly higher dispersion in their investment performance. 




funds averaged 18.2%. Furthermore, once the hedge funds were categorized into Lipper-
provided strategies and the dispersion versus the strategy medians was calculated, the 
dispersion decreased only slightly to 17.5% (a 4% reduction). In comparison, the authors 
also used the Morningstar database of mutual fund performance to examine how much 
dispersion could be attributed to strategy. When adjusted for strategy, dispersion fell to 
3.6% for fixed income (a 52% reduction) and 7.4% (a 37% reduction) for equities.6 
 
This result demonstrates that virtually all dispersion in hedge fund returns during the 10-
year period was driven by manager-related risk, not investment strategy. While the vast 
majority of industry participants seek to categorize hedge funds by strategy (perhaps 
because it’s easier to understand), it is a poor framework for exploiting data for 
meaningful data that might translate to actionable recommendations. 
 
Why Quantitative Measures Are Useful for Practitioners 
 
In practice, there are tens of thousands of hedge fund managers located across the world 
and hundreds are launched each year.7 For any practitioner that wants to explore the 
marketplace, quantitative measures are a scalable solution to be able to quickly filter 
through data that can be found on Bloomberg, hedge fund databases available for 
purchase, or even social networking sites dedicated to hedge fund investing. In addition, 
                                                          
6 Wilson, Pete, and Jason Malinowski. Hedge Fund Breakthrough. Publication no. July 2012. N.p.: 
Blackrock, 2012. Print. 
7 Citi Investor Services: Business Advisory, “The Rise of Liquid Alternatives”. Presentation to CAIA in 




maintaining a wide range of measures that quantify risk and return – the two building 
blocks of investment analysis – allow for flexibility and focused methods of identifying 
hedge fund investments that have performed in line with very specific parameters. 
Allocators seeking to invest in hedge funds come with a wide variety of desires, ranging 
from reducing volatility and correlation to the broad market to leveraged bets on 
directional market exposure. 
  
Risk and Return 
 
As mentioned above, risk and return are the two building blocks of investment analysis 
and are measured using either absolute or relative measures. Absolute measures focus on 
standalone nominal returns while relative measures focus on returns relative to a certain 
benchmark. The debate of whether measuring investment performance relative to an 
index or on a standalone basis has been a long-standing one in the investment 
community. It is even more heated in the hedge fund industry because of the fee 
structures. For instance, when the hedge fund industry first started, most investors were 
focused on generating absolute returns. To create alignment around the focus on absolute 
returns, hedge funds would charge a 20% performance fee on all profits. This 
incentivized hedge fund managers to focus on generating profits in all market 
environments. While the industry may have initially been tasked with focusing on 
absolute returns, the past few decades have transformed it into one with a wide variety of 
mandates. Both absolute and relative measures can add value to the analysis and selection 





The following section will highlight some of the most frequently used quantitative 
measures to assess the performance of an investment manager prior to the advent of the 
Markowitz’ landmark paper published in 1952. The prevailing theme of these 
measurements are that they are measuring performance ex post. In the section after this, 
we will explore how Markowitz laid the groundwork for the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) which drastically improve the quantitative measures being used to evaluate 
investment performance. 
 
A. Absolute Measures 
Average Return (Arithmetic Mean): A simple average return that is calculated by 
summing the returns for each period and dividing the total by the number of periods. The 
simple average return does not consider the compounding effect of returns. Because it 
does not take into account the compounding effect, average returns are the best tool for 
calculating an expected return over short periods of time. 






where N = number of periods and 𝑅𝑖 is the return for period i. 
 
Compound Monthly Return (Geometric): The monthly average return that assumes the 
same return every period that results in the equivalent compound growth rate from the 




period, would produce a final dollar equivalent to the actual final investment value. The 
geometric return is the best tool for calculating an expected return over a long-term 
investment horizon. 
Geometric Return = {∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖)}
1
𝑁 − 1𝑁𝑖=1  
where N = number of periods, and 𝑅𝑖 is the return for period i. 
 
Maximum Drawdown: Measures the loss in any losing period during a fund’s investment 
record. It is defined as the percent retrenchment from a fund’s peak value to the fund’s 
valley value. The drawdown is in effect from the time the fund’s retrenchment begins 
until a new fund high is reached. The maximum drawdown encompasses both the period 
from the fund’s peak to the fund’s valley (length), and the time from the fund’s valley to 
a new fund high (recovery). It measures the largest percentage drawdown that has 





where NAVi and NAVj are the net asset values at time i and j, respectively, and  j > i. 
 
B. Relative Measures 
The Up Capture Ratio measures the fund’s compound return when the fund’s benchmark 
return increased, divided by the benchmark’s compound return when the benchmark 
return increased. The higher the value, the better. 









The Down Capture Ratio measures the fund’s compound return when the benchmark was 
down divided by the benchmark’s compound return when the benchmark was down. The 
smaller the value, the better. 








In 1952, Harry Markowitz published an article titled “Portfolio Selection” that would 
spawn countless developments in finance, financial mathematics, portfolio management, 
and much more. The article, published in the Journal of Finance, outlined the roots of 
modern portfolio theory.8 The primary finding in his paper was a quantifiable method that 
connected portfolio risk and portfolio return. 
 
The theory is based on maximizing a specific utility function meant to model an 
investor’s terminal wealth.  Return is defined by the expected return and risk is defined as 
the standard deviation of the wealth, or its volatility. For a risk-averse investor, the theory 
offers a solution to identify the highest reward for the least amount of risk at target return 
levels. These portfolios are said to be mean-variance efficient. One of the key differences 
in Markowitz’s work as compared to previous studies was the focus on overall portfolios. 
                                                          




Prior to this paper, many researchers focused on individual securities or asset classes and 
researched concepts of efficient markets. Markowitz was less interested in efficient 
markets – instead, he focused on efficient portfolios.  
 
The formulation of Markowitz’s model is built on some key assumptions: 
1. Individuals construct their wealth in order to maximize the expected utility of 
their terminal wealth.  
2. Asset returns are jointly normally distributed random variables. 
3. Correlations between assets are fixed and constant and forever.  
4. All investors are rational and risk-averse. 
5. All investors have access to the same information at the same time.  
6. Risk/volatility of an asset is known in advance and is constant.  
7. All securities can be divided into parcels of any size.  
8. Any investor can lend or borrow an unlimited amount at the risk-free rate of 
interest. 
Since a portfolio is a linear combination of assets, its expected return and variance are 
expressed as a function of all the underlying assets, represented by the following: 













where xi denotes the proportion of asset i held in the portfolio; E(Ri) denotes the expected 
return of asset I; and cov(Ri, Rj) denotes the covariance between asset i and j.  
 
In its simplest form, to find an efficient portfolio, the model calls for minimizing the 
variance of the portfolio by setting a target return and the sum of the weighting of assets 
to one. While there are many more constraints that can be introduced and explored, this 
finding was the fundamental piece that revolutionized the industry of finance. For any 
given return, this relationship could find the efficient portfolio. The curve demonstrated 
by all the efficient portfolios for a given return target is called the efficient frontier.  
 
One interesting result, demonstrated by Black’s Theorem,9 shows that all points on the 
efficient frontier can be replicated by any combination of two distinct portfolios that are 
on the efficient frontier. This finding, known as a separation theorem, demonstrates that 
portfolio construction can be done in two successive stages. First, money managers can 
construct two distinct portfolios on the efficient frontier. Then, they can combine them in 
any way to reach return targets for investors seeking to maximize terminal wealth. 10 One 
direct influence of this finding is the proliferation of portfolios with just stocks and bonds 
and reduced exposure to alternative strategies. The next section explores how this theory 
was extended to build simple and usable models for investors to quantify the risk and 
                                                          
9 Black, F., “Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing”, Journal of Business, vol. 45, 1972, 
pp. 444-454. 
10 Amenc, Noël, and Véronique Le Sourd. Portfolio Theory and Performance Analysis. Chichester, 




reward on specific assets, including a groundbreaking paper by William Sharpe in 1953 
titled “A Simplified Model for Portfolio Analysis.” 11 
 
Empirical Market and Capital Asset Pricing Models 
 
A. The Empirical Market Model 
In his research, Sharpe presented a simplification of Markowitz’s model by presenting 
the empirical market model, also known as Sharpe’s single-index model. While it has no 
theoretical basis, the model is used for testing the CAPM empirically by estimating the 
beta empirically. The model was formulated as follows: 
The variance in asset returns have a linear dependency on factors that are common to the 
whole market as well as factors that are unique to each asset. The factors that are 
common to the whole market can be represented by a market index. The empirical market 
model is therefore written as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
where Rit denotes the return on asset i, RMt denotes the return on the market index, 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
denotes the specific return on asset i, and 𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖 are the coefficients to be determined. 
 
                                                          





The coefficients of the line 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are obtained by linear regression of the market 
returns on the asset returns for the same period, using an ordinary least squares 





As a result of this model definition, the residual terms 𝜖𝑖𝑡 are non-correlated with market 
return. The total risk of an asset can then be broken down into market risk and non-
market risk: 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽𝑖
2𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀𝑡) + 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜖𝑖𝑡)12 
While Markowitz developed the computationally intensive portfolio theory, Sharpe 
developed a much simpler model that rendered it more operational. The next step was for 
Sharpe to study the influence of his findings on asset prices, which resulted in the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The CAPM, in turn, introduced the theory of asset 
valuation, intimately tying risk and return. 
 
B. The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Below are the assumptions of the CAPM: 
1. Investors are risk averse and seek to maximize the expected utility of their 
wealth at the end of the period. 
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2. When choosing their portfolios, investors only consider the first two moments 
of return distribution: the expected return and variance. 
3. Investors only consider one investment period and that period is the same for 
all investors. 
4. Investors have a limitless capacity to borrow and lend at the risk-free rate. 
5. Information is accessible cost-free and is available simultaneously to all 
investors. All investors therefore have the same forecast return, variance and 
covariance expectations for all assets. 
6. Markets are perfect: there are no taxes and no transaction costs. All assets are 
traded and infinitely divisible.13 
 
The CAPM is characterized by the following relationship: 




Where E(Ri) is the expected return of asset i, Rf is the risk free rate, E(RM) is the 
expected return of the market, 𝜎𝑀 denotes the variance of the market portfolio, and 𝜎𝑖𝑀 
denotes the covariance between asset i and the market portfolio. 
 
The line that is thereby defined is called the Security Market Line. At equilibrium, all 
assets are located on this line. This fundamental relationship states that at equilibrium, 
every asset’s expected return is a composite of the rate of return on the risk free asset and 
an asset-specific risk premium. This risk premium can be calculated by multiplying the 
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price of risk by the quantity of risk. The price of risk is simply the difference between the 
expected rate of return on the asset and the risk free rate. The quantity of risk, which is 





The beta is equal to the covariance between the return on asset i, and the return on the 
market portfolio divided by the variance of the market portfolio. As you can see, this beta 
matches up with the definition of beta used in the empirical market model earlier14  
 
This pricing model provides a framework for understanding asset values by breaking 
down how to evaluate expected returns with expected risk. In addition, it breaks down the 
total risk of a security into two components: systematic and unsystematic risk. In 
addition, this model provides a framework for evaluating attractiveness of different assets 
by assessing the differences between the asset prices and the equilibrium price, located on 
the security market line, a massive step forward for analyzing investment opportunities 
and investment performance. 15 
 
C. Limitations of the CAPM 
Any equilibrium model for the financial markets assumes some form of market 
efficiency. The first definition, given by Eugene Fama, states that markets are efficient 
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and the prices of assets immediately reflect all available information. 16 The assumptions 
needed for the CAPM theory to hold true includes a strong assumptions about market 
efficiency. In 1972, Black’s Zero-Beta Model17 demonstrated that the CAPM could exist 
even without including previous assumptions regarding the risk free rate. MJ Brennan18 
introduced a version that took taxes into account.  Robert Merton presented a model that 
operated in continuous time rather than at discrete moments in time. Countless other 
versions of the CAPM were developed over time to adjust for perceived weaknesses in 
the model. Others criticized the validity of the CAPM’s application to real life. In one 
notable case, Richard Roll demonstrated that it was impossible to include all risky assets 
in the security market line. Because the CAPM assumed that all risky assets were 
included in its mean-variance optimization, Roll stated that the theory could never be 
empirically proven. 19 While it didn’t disprove the CAPM, it did challenge the idea that it 
fully captured the opportunity set available to investors. 
 
In modern hedge funds, it is interesting to note that many hedge fund investment 
strategies are designed to exploit situations that are contrary to each of the assumptions 
necessary for the CAPM to hold true. For example, many investors do not have the 
resources to enhance their portfolios with colocation technology to provide an edge in 
finding out market information before all other market participants. This is common in 
                                                          
16 Fama, E., “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work”, Journal of Finance, 
vol. 25, no. 2, March 1970, pp. 383-417. 
17 Black, F., “Capital Markets Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing”, Journal of Business, no. 45, July 
1972, pp. 444-445.  
18 Brennan, M. “Taxes, Market Valuation and Corporate Financial Policy”, National Tax Journal, no. 25, 
1970, pp. 417-427. 





high-frequency trading strategies. Another classic example is that different market 
participants are influenced by things other than expected return and variance. Often 
times, liquidity needs influence investment behavior in a way that can generate 
systematic returns for the liquidity provider. 
 
Application of Pricing Models to Performance Measurement  
 
The CAPM provides a method for assessing returns relative to risk, or risk-adjusted 
returns. Below are a selection of measures that are often used to assess the performance 
of hedge fund manager. 
 
Alpha measures the fund’s value added relative to a benchmark. Alpha simply represents 
the non-systemic return generated by an asset. The larger an investment or fund 
manager’s ability to generate alpha, the more attractive it is to an allocator in the hedge 
fund world. Alpha generation is typically the single most important quantitative 
consideration and sought after quality when allocating to hedge fund managers.  
Alpha = 𝛼 = R - 𝛽(𝑅𝑀) 
 
The Treynor ratio was introduced in 1965 and measures the relationship between the 
performance of a portfolio above the risk-free rate and its systemic risk. 20 The ratio is 
derived directly from the CAPM. It is designed to evaluate whether a portfolio of assets 
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related to a certain reference benchmark is sufficiently rewarding the investor. The return 
(numerator) is defined as the incremental average return of a fund over the risk-free rate. 
The risk (denominator) is defined as a fund’s beta relative to a benchmark. This measure 
is used quite often when very large allocators group together potential hedge fund 
investment opportunities by various stratifications. For example, if an allocator is 
evaluating multiple emerging market funds, s/he would compare their Treynor measures 
to see which one is generating the most desirable performance relative to an emerging 
market index. The larger the ratio, the better. 





One of the weaknesses of the Treynor ratio was that it only made sense to use it on 
subsets of portfolios relative to comparable benchmarks. The results of the measurement 
are heavily influenced by the reference benchmark selection, which has been frequently 
criticized. So, the following year, Sharpe introduced a measure to eliminate that problem. 
 
The reward-to-variability ratio, as Sharpe called it in his 1966 publication, measures the 
excess return, or risk premium relative to the risk free rate and the total risk in the 
portfolio.21 More commonly known as the Sharpe ratio, investment manager can be 
assessed quickly relative to the Sharpe ratio of the market. While it holds close 
relationship with the CAPM, it is derived from portfolio theory and is not subject to much 
of the criticism of the CAPM and its directly derived measures.  
                                                          









One of the advantages of the Sharpe ratio is that because it is based on total risk in a 
portfolio, it also accounts for non-systemic risk in an asset or taken by a hedge fund 
manager. Because of the robust nature of this measure, there are many meaningful 
variations in use today.22 The return is defined as the fund’s incremental average return 
over the risk-free rate. The risk is defined as the standard deviation of the fund’s returns. 
 
The Jensen measure, introduced in 1968, is derived directly from the CAPM, and is 
subject to much of the same criticism as the Treynor ratio. 23 However, it provides useful 
results to many allocators and is commonly used to evaluate hedge funds today. The 
measure explores whether a portfolio that is generating alpha is skill or luck. The 
measure conducts the following regression: 
 𝑅𝑃𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑃 + 𝛽𝑃(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) + 𝜖𝑃𝑡  
 
To evaluate whether the alpha generation is skill or luck, one calculates the t-statistic of 
the regression, which represents the estimated value of the alpha divided by its standard 
deviation. Assuming the alpha values are normally distributed, if the t-statistic is greater 
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than 2, it indicates that the probability of having obtained the result through luck, and not 
through skill, is less than 5%.24 
 
Practitioners Beware: Shortcomings of Quantitative Metrics  
 
In practice, countless evaluators stumble in their diligence by not recognizing some of the 
shortcomings of quantitative metrics. In many cases, the operating history of a hedge 
fund may not be long enough to generate statistically significant information. In others, 
the risk-taking behaviors of a hedge fund may have changed drastically during its tenure, 
rendering parts of the track record irrelevant for consideration in determining expected 
returns going forward.   
 
One of the most devious missteps is when hedge fund managers do not report their 
performance numbers and /or risk exposures in a consistent manner relative to the 
broader hedge fund industry. In many ways, this was a large contributor to the 2008 
financial crisis. Many hedge funds and institutional investors were generating consistent, 
positive returns by selling insurance contracts on collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). 
Based on the numbers, selling insurance on CDOs was a strategy that generated 
significant absolute returns with very low variability for years. The longer track the track 
record got, the more institutional investors and foundations grew comfortable with the 
strategy and started allocating more and more capital. However, the risk exposure was 
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extremely high, and ultimately, many allocators who were sold on the numbers and had 
not taken the time to understand the risk they were taking had suffered massive losses. 
Ultimately, quantitative measures only tell a small part of the story when evaluating 
hedge fund investment opportunities.  
 
Modern Standards for Quantitative Hedge Fund Performance 
Measurement  
 
Because of a diversity of nefarious reporting practices, the fund management industry has 
slowly adopted consistent standards for performance reporting. The Global Investments 
Performance Standards (GIPS) standards are voluntary, ethical standards for calculation 
and presentation of an investment firm’s performance results.  The GIPS have their origin 
in the late 1980s, when the Association for Investment Management and Research 
(AIMR) first developed the Performance Presentation Standards (AIMR-PPS) for North 
America. In the late 1990s the GIPS committee published the standards after receiving 
extensive public commentary and formal endorsement from the AIMR Board of 
Governors. In 2006, the GIPS standards were finally approved by AIMR’s successor, the 
CFA Institute and become a truly global standard, eliminating all country-specific 
versions.25  
 
While traditional asset managers have been quick to pick up the standards and apply 
them, alternative investment managers have been much slower in adopting the standards. 
                                                          





In response to the Madoff scandal discovered in 2008, the CFA also released a Guidance 
Statement on Alternative Investment Strategies for comment in 2011 which were 
subsequently adopted in 2012.26 In addition, third-party administrators that independently 
verify net asset value every month have become a “must-have” in the industry.27  
 
Real-life Application: The Satori Capital Approach 
 
Satori Capital is a multi-strategy alternative investment firm founded upon the principles 
of conscious capitalism. Based in Texas, Satori’s private equity business partners with 
management teams of companies with $5 million to $20 million of earnings that operate 
with a long-term perspective, commit to their mission or purpose, and create value for all 
stakeholders. Satori Alpha designs and manages customized alternative investment 
portfolios for family offices and institutions. At the end of Q3 2014, Satori Alpha 
managed approximately $250 million of assets.  
 
As the portfolio manager and one of four investment committee members at Satori Alpha, 
in addition to determining allocations between different alternative investment asset 
classes and strategies, a key part of my role is sourcing, evaluating, and deciding whether 
or not to invest in hedge funds across the globe. Since I began my role in 2012, I have 
evaluated over 2200 hedge funds on behalf of our investor partners to try and find great 
investment opportunities. In that time, our firm has allocated to nine distinct hedge funds, 
                                                          
26 “Guidance Statement on Alternative Investment Strategies and Structures”. CFA Institute, Oct 2012. 
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or less than 0.5% of hedge funds evaluated. It begs the question, how does Satori filter 
out so many funds during our diligence process? 
 
A. Overview of the Satori Alpha Investment Process 
During our diligence process, we evaluate and score hedge fund managers in five key 
categories: leadership, strategy, operations, asymmetry, and sustainability. Each category 
has areas for review; for example, under sustainability, we evaluate a fund based on its 
culture, how it treats all of its stakeholders, and if the world would be a better place if it 
grew to be 100x larger, amongst many other topics.   
 
Asymmetry is the most pertinent to the concepts explored so far in this paper. In Satori’s 
definition, this comprises of returns, risk, market environment, edge, and partnership 
structure. For the first two, the quantitative measures introduced in this paper play a key 
role in filtering through opportunities.  
 
First, our team identifies a multi-year macroeconomic theme that we think presents the 
opportunity to generate double-digit investment returns with low risk of permanent loss 
of capital. Once we are all in agreement on an attractive macroeconomic theme, we begin 
to source as many hedge funds that could potentially capitalize on the theme as possible. 
The sourcing process occurs through personal networks, placement agents, hedge fund 
social networks, capital introduction teams at prime brokerages and a variety of others. 




evaluating geometric returns, simple alpha analysis and maximum drawdowns and 
compile a list of the top five investment opportunities. If the firm is not presenting GIPS-
compliant material, our team first examines past prime broker statements or audits to 
confirm that the track record presented is legitimate. Those five move to a thorough 
inspection of alpha.  
 
In addition to calculating how much alpha is generated relative to the appropriate 
benchmark every month since the firm’s inception, we examine many other stratifications 
to see if we can identify certain patterns. For example, we review gross and net exposures 
to adjust beta factors on the overall portfolio and for the long and short books 
individually. If necessary, we break out alpha attribution by sector, market cap, 
geography, and in some cases, investment thesis with the purpose of trying to get a sense 
of how the hedge fund generates (or does not generate) alpha for its investors.  
Once the alpha analysis is complete, we examine the hit ratio of the investor. We ask, 
“How frequently have past investments in the hedge fund generated alpha?” The goal is 
to understand if the firm is a “one-hit wonder” or if they have the “Midas touch” in 
identifying and investing in attractive opportunities.  
 
One interesting note is that the Satori investment committee is entirely absolute return 
driven, yet the initial screening metrics implement some form of relative evaluation. 
While this may seem nonsensical, we believe it adds value by informing us if the 




without any real skill. The majority of funds we have screened are filtered out after we 
examine the batting ratio. 
  
After our team gets a quantitative sense of how alpha is generated, it assesses the 
opportunity against the investment committee’s acceptable investment regimes. Those 
three regimes include conservative, core, and opportunistic allocations, which are defined 
by expected return and risk measures articulated by the investment committee.   











Capital at risk 
of permanent 
loss 
Conservative 10-15% 10% or less 0-15% Less than 5% 
Core  15% or greater 10% or more 0-25% Less than 15% 
Opportunistic 30% or greater Multiple of 
Capital 
25% or greater 15% or greater 
 
If team members feel like there is a chance that an investment vehicle may fit one of the 
regimes listed above, the diligence process continues into evaluating macroeconomic 
factors, asset valuations, and sentiment to understand the potential beta exposure the 
investment opportunity may have. In addition, structural inefficiencies and process 
repeatability are explored to see if the fund manager will have the ability to continue to 
generate outsized risk-adjusted returns on behalf of investors. Every single one of our 
hedge fund allocations is generating returns because of a structural inefficiency that 





B. A Tale of Two Funds 
In 2012, Satori was exploring the idea of allocation to non-agency residential mortgage-
backed (subprime) bonds. Subprime mortgage-backed bonds caught our attention because 
of their compelling risk/reward profile, partly related to the unloved nature of the asset 
and the fact that banks had exited this market.  Throughout our vigorous search for 
investment managers that fit our criteria for this asset class, we partnered with several 
experienced teams who were able to source bonds with double digit yields, floating-rate 
protection, and quality credit enhancement to protect against defaults.  Interestingly, the 
vast majority of these bonds were backed by loans originated prior to 2008, so all of the 
borrowers in the mortgage pools had already made it through arguably the worst housing 
downturn since the Great Depression.  If borrowers were going to default, we believed 
most would have already done so.  The biggest risk to our thesis was that there would be 
another massive drop in US home prices similar to 2008 and our analysis led us to 
believe that this was very unlikely. 
 
For the purpose of this paper, I will examine two funds that Satori has reviewed in this 
space – one that made it onto our platform and another that didn’t. I start by first 



















(Geometric Mean) 31.64% 11.68% 7.88% 
Average Monthly Return 2.33% 0.93% 0.65% 
Maximum Drawdown N/A -0.27% -3.66% 
Annualized Alpha 30.49% 12.42% N/A 
Treynor Ratio 80.87% -39.07% N/A 
Sharpe Ratio 4.95 2.87 0.52 
Jensen – t-statistic 8.58% 4.35% N/A 
 
The Regan Distressed Credit Fund, LP (Regan) and RMBS Structured Products Fund 
(Structured Products fund) both met our initial conservative annualized return target of 
greater than 10%. It is clear that Regan’s return profile is much higher than the Structured 
Products fund in both the annualized return and average monthly return calculations. 
Surprisingly, Regan has never experienced a drawdown since the inception of the firm. 
This usually sends a yellow flag to our diligence team to thoroughly inspect the risk 
profile and valuation policy of the fund. In this case, everything looked good and we are 





The negative Treynor ratio of the Structured Products fund indicates that it is not 
producing incremental return for investors over the risk-free rate relative to the 
benchmark used.  This is a big red flag for our diligence process and would be a reason to 
discard the investment opportunity. Regan’s Sharpe ratio indicates that it is producing 
almost 8x the risk-adjusted returns of the benchmark. On an absolute basis, a 4.95 Sharpe 
ratio is extremely high for a fund that has invested in public securities over a long period 
of time. Lastly, the Jensen Alpha t-statistic indicates that Regan is likely producing alpha 
through skill while the Structured Products Fund is generating alpha through luck.  
 
All of this data indicates that Regan has the more desirable investment profile. The next 
step was to examine how Regan was consistently generating alpha in an investment 
strategy centered on subprime credit bonds.  
 
Show Me the Alpha 
 
In order to better understand how Regan was outperforming the majority of its peers, we 




Figure 4: Return Attribution for Regan in from February 2012-January 2013 
 
In this graph, one notices that the majority of returns are not coming from security 
selection, but from trading profits. As we dove deeper, we realized that the real key to 
Regan’s success was that ever since 2008, the firms that use to trade or make markets for 
these securities were no longer willing or able to do so. Regan had become a liquidity 
provider of last resort in a market where spreads had significantly widened. In addition, 
the manager was doing it with no leverage, indicating a very low-risk strategy. In fact, 
Regan consistently sat on 20% cash to take advantage of opportunities in the market, 
thereby reducing its exposure to market effects. This was very unusual for the space. 
Many fixed income hedge funds lever up more than 5x.  
 
The Satori Alpha investment team and committee quickly realized that Regan was an 




on an alpha generation opportunity through active trading and market making. The 
combination of positive expectancies on both the beta and the alpha of the opportunity 
made it a very attractive investment.   
 
After conducting thorough diligence on all the other categories, Regan was added to the 
Satori Alpha platform in 2012 and has grown to one of our largest positions. While the 
beta of the trade has tightened, Regan has consistently been able to generate outsized 
returns because of its sustainable edge in generating alpha. Below is the most recent 
version of the return attribution, which demonstrates that the trading profit continues to 
generate alpha for investors. 





Manager selection in hedge fund investing is the main driver of performance for 




assets, quantitative measures can enhance any investor’s diligence process. With an 
estimated 10,000 hedge funds in existence at any given time, having a scalable solution to 
quantitatively evaluate new hedge fund investment opportunities can create significant 
bandwidth for an allocator to focus on the qualitative elements that are typically more 
time-consuming in the diligence process. Further, as the GIPS standards become more 
pervasive, it creates an easier playing ground for allocators across the globe to assess 
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